


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## The Arakanese Student and Youth Movements Series-5: The Strategies and Tactics After 8.8.88.

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## The Arakanese Student and Youth Movements Series-5: The Strategies and Tactics After 8.8.88.

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**A Tactical Deception.** The 1990 general election is the most significant event in the aftermath of the 8.8.88 uprising. Soon after taking the helm of the nation, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) announced formation of the Election Commission, encouraged to form political parties, and urged them to participate in the planned 1990 election. It also boldly announced that it would transfer the power to the body of the elected representatives. As a person who had been closely studying the strategies and tactics of Burmese military government, I hardly believe it; it was too good to believe! I analyzed that the 1990-election would be meaningless, as it would be held for a non-existent People's Assembly in the absence of a constitution, and under the whim of the military totalitarianism. The SLORC was undertaking all these good-looking democratic ventures in order to buy time to consolidate its power. In other words, it was a classic tactical deception.

I conveyed my analysis to the Rakhaing leadership that was at the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. U Kyaw Hlaing, who was the President of the Arakan Independent Organization (AIO), as well as the Chairman of the National United Front of Arakan (NUFA), which was the fore-runner of the present National United Party of Arakan (NUPA), turned up in my office in Dhaka. He was accompanied by U Oo Khin Maung and Comrade Ahnarni Tun Sein. The former was a Central Executive Committee (Politburo) member of Arakan Communist Party (ACP) and Joint-Secretary of NUFA and the later was the leader of the faction of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) that joined the NUFA. They had reached the same conclusion independently and wanted to discuss what would be the best path for the pro-democracy activists inside Burma. For them it was clear that the armed struggle was the only feasibility. We reached a conclusion that those activists in the cities had to rebel or to cooperate with the military

junta and that we did not think Daw Suu (Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi Aris) would opt to become a guerrilla leader. She would take the chance of the election by following the rules set by the junta. We all agreed that she would get trapped without any escape from the whims of the junta.

**The Revolutionary Rakhaings.** Denouncing the military junta that killed more than 10,000 peaceful demonstrators, some 10,000 hardcore youths, students, and monks occupied the border areas with a view of a revolution. More than 700 Rakhaing students, youths, and monks landed in the Bangladesh-Burma border. In November 1988, an umbrella organization in the name of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was formed in a rush, at the headquarter of the Karen National Union (KNU) at the Thai-Burma border. The Rakhaing leaders U Khemasara, President of All Burma Young Monk Union (ABYMU), Ako Than Win, a central leader of All Burma Students and Youth Union (ABSYU), and Khaing Saw Tun, a lawyer who had just joined the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), were the visible new comers. Among the veteran Rakhaing guerrilla leaders, the key figures were U Kyaw Hlaing (NUFA-AIO), Major Myo Min (ALP), U Pho Tun (ALP) and Comrade Khaing Soe Naing Aung, who was the Secretary of the National Democratic Front (NDF). U Kyaw Hla (Br. Mustafa Kamal), a Rakhaing Muslim, who was (and still is) the Chairman of the Muslim Liberation Organization of Burma (MLOB) graced the DAB conference. I attended the conference for three days. The top leadership of the DAB was made up of the Karen National Union (KNU), the Kachin Independent Organization (KIO), the Committee for Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB), ABSYC and ABYMU. The DAB instantly boasted a membership of more than 70,000 including a 16,000 strong fighting force.

At the same time, the Rakhaing revolutionaries at the Bangladesh-Burma border, formed ABSYU(Arakan) and ABYMU(Arakan) and supported DAB. Such young student leaders like Khaing Hsan Aung, Khaing Mrat Kyaw, Khaing Kyaw Kyaw, and young monk leader Bikkhu U Thiha came to the forefront.

**In Quest of Power.** In 1966 Phadu Summit<sup>(1)</sup>, our Red Comrade Chairman Kyaw Zan Hwree told us, “power cannot be shared, only duty can be divided.” In the cities there arose more than 200 political parties that applied for the registration with the SLORC’s Election Commission, vying for the 1990-election, and subsequent grasping of the power. A number of political parties emerged in the Myanmar Rakhine State. These were Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), National Democratic Party for Human Rights (NDPHR), Mro (or) Khami National Solidarity Organization (M/KNSO), Arakan Nationalities Democratic Party (ANDP), Arakan People’s Democratic Front (APDF), Arakan National Unity Organization (ANUO), Kamen National Democracy League (KNDL), and National League for Democracy (NLD, Rakhine State). Similar ethnic race based political parties were formed in the provinces of the Chin, the Kachin, the Shan, the Karenni, the Karen, and the Mon. In contrast to these regional political parties, the National League for Democracy (NLD) stood out as the biggest national party encompassing every nook and corner of Burma. All of these parties believed that after the election they will be in power and the Myanmar Armed Forces would return to the barrack, obeying the order of the civilian government. Meanwhile, the revolutionary organization, DAB, announced its support to the city-based political parties and their decision to participate in the election. It also urged the junta to keep its promise.

**The SLORC.** The new military government under the leadership of General Saw Maung called it self as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The law and order restoration program is not new in Burma. U Nu used it in 1949 when the country was burning with civil war. When I was young I saw his government policy, “Establishment of peace in towns and country and the rule of law and order is the primary goal”, posted in the billboards all over the city. The billboards came down only in 1958 when General seized the power for the first time. General Saw Maung and his colleagues smartly picked up U Nu’s trail and called themselves “the State Law and Order Restoration Council”, following the proven path of the success. At the same time the SLORC intelligently set the nation at large, making them occupied with campaigning for the 1990 election. The world was stunned with surprise. As a matter of fact, the people were overjoyed with the belief that the military rule would come to an end very soon. Even the DAB, a revolutionary organization of formidable strength, delayed its action to wait and see the election results. Thus the SLORC injected a gentle dose of tranquilizer into the vital veins of Burma and the world. Meanwhile it started to strengthen itself quietly but rigorously and rapidly with perfect military professionalism. When Burma and the world woke up from the tranquilizer’s effect in late 1990, the Myanmar armed forces was already 300,000-strong, and modernized with high-tech hardware, mainly from China, at a cost of estimated 1.2 billion dollars. Strong and ready to face any challenges of internal or external origin, it flatly refused to hand over the power to the body of the elected people’s representatives in 1990. The Armed Forces promoted themselves and a 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant became a Lieutenant and General Saw Maung became a 5-star Senior General. Pretty neat, I remarked at that time.

Just for your information, the Myanmar Armed Forces strength was 5000 in 1948, 70,000 in 1958, and 180,000 in 1988. Today in 2004, it is 500,000 strong, the largest in Southeast Asia, and it dictates the nation in the name of State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Sr. Gen. Saw Maung retired in 1995 and died in 1997. Today, SPDC is led by Sr. Gen Than Shwe and its government by Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, who was a Maj. General in 1988.

Another big victory of the junta was that it successfully persuaded some 7,000 of the 10,000 rebel-to-be students and youths to come back to the fold of ‘the parents’. The billboards, saying “Tatmadaw is the Father; Tamadaw is the Mother,” were displayed all over the country. The Burmese word *Tamadaw* means armed forces.

**Wrong Confrontation.** The 1990 election was free and fair. The SLORC declared that the People’s Assembly would be summoned and the job of the elected representatives was to draft a new constitution. The People’s Assembly would also be composed of the junta’s representatives to participate in drafting the constitution. When the draft constitution is adopted by the national referendum, the fresh election would be conducted as per provision of the constitution and the junta would transfer the power to the constitutionally elected people’s representatives. I view this as a “checkmate”, another grand display of the junta’s “Catch-22<sup>(2)</sup>.” Sr. General Saw Maung did say he would transfer the power to the body of the elected representatives in 1988. This was a very generalized agreement; but the details of the power-transfer protocol were not mentioned at all. The political parties, including the NLD, never bother to ask the details – another weakness of the newborn politicians. Needless to say, the election victor NLD and Daw Suu demanded immediate power transfer and charged the SLORC as the

promise-breaker. The SLORC simply crushed the political parties and banned them. It was wrong to confront the military junta at that junction. My reasons are given below.

**Political Consolidation** The proposed constituent assembly would have given opportunity to the NLD and all political parties to strengthen their political institutions. The parties were merely one year-old, still in early infancy. Institutionalization of the political infrastructure is so crucial and vital in building strength, stamina, solidarity, and resources that are needed to dig in for a long run. Daw Suu, NLD and all political parties failed to see this simple and fundamental maxim.

**A Bargaining Venue.** The proposed constituent assembly would have served as a negotiating and bargaining venue with the military leaders. Please compare this with the philosophy of the tripartite (i.e. SLORC-NLD-Ethnic Minorities) dialogue that the pro-democracy parties demanded later on. The United Nations also advocated for a dialogue between the junta and Daw Suu. In all account, the constituent assembly would have been a better platform than a tripartite dialogue or a Junta-DawSuu dialogue. This opportunity was turned down by the political infancy.

**Logistics vs. Logic.** In a power struggle, a political party does not confront the ruling military junta unless it has a strong card that the military leaders may heed. For example, in 1988, the military junta's gesture of liberalization by allowing the multiparty system and promising an election and return of the power to the citizens did not come from the liberated hearts of the military leaders. They did it to prevent major rebellion and to buy time to consolidate the shaken military rule. If the former military commanders like such as Aung Gyi, Kyi Muang, Tin Oo, etc., called for an armed insurrection at least 30% of the armed forces was ready to take their command. Daw Suu was *the* spade ace at that time. The trio Aung-Suu-Tin (Aung Gyi-Daw Suu-Tin Oo) was very popular. At that junction the SLORC diverted entire nation on the election. Meanwhile, the SLORC purged all military commanders and soldiers who were sympathetic to the pro-democracy movement. The young officers from the most trusted Light Infantry Divisions 22 and 44, etc. were promoted to the commanding officer ranks and entrusted with the command of various battalions, brigades, and divisions in all military cantonments across the country. Similarly, it managed to persuade the more than 7,000 revolutionary students and youths to abandon the rebellion, as described above. As mentioned earlier, by 1990 the armed forces were already enlarged, modernized, and strengthened, ready to encounter any form of internal or external challenge. On the other hand, Daw Suu and NLD had lost all the strong bases upon which they could stand and bargain with the junta. They were totally wrong to stand on the quantitative values of the voters who made them the election winner. Under a military rule, the quantities of the votes never matter unless the voters are ready and capable of rising in arms to rebel against the junta. In the absence of such preposition, a confrontation with the military junta is futile. This is a bitter political reality that has been repeatedly proven in the Third World, with good regional examples of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia. The Myanmar pro-democracy leaders failed to learn a lesson from the neighbors. It was wrong for Daw Suu, NLD and other political parties to confront the military rule with simple logic without any logistics.

**East-West Confrontation.** By accepting the proposed constituent assembly, NLD and all political parties would have acquired opportunity to make regional and international friends. Relying entirely on the apparent western support, Daw Suu and



NLD miserably undermined the importance of the neighbors. Their dependency upon the western nations completely alienated them from the region. In contrast, showing a great talent in diplomacy, the SLORC succeeded winning the hearts of the ASEAN countries, eventually becoming an ASEAN member in 1997. It also rejuvenated relationship with its traditional ally, China, gaining a \$1.2 billion barter contract to purchase modern and sophisticated military hardware to upgrade its armed forces. Thus, the SLORC smartly took refuge in the bosom of the neighbors and regional powers to repel any form of the western menace that may come against them. Remarkably, apart from their pro-democracy broadcasts and moral support, the western countries gave only \$2 millions in terms of material, \$1 million as the Nobel Peace Prize to Daw Suu and another million to rehabilitate the Myanmarese refugees in western countries. In the essence, the SLORC smartly alienated the Daw Suu and the pro-democracy activists by creating polarization of the classic East-West confrontation.

Recently, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Chief, General Khin Nyunt, who was also the Prime Minister of Myanmar since August 2003, was discharged from his duties and arrested on the 19<sup>th</sup> of October 2004. This could be seen as a removal of the last western influence that may have remained inside the Myanmar Armed Forces. He was trained by the US-CIA, the British HM Secret Service, and the Israelis in Diego Garcia, which is a British territory in Indian Ocean. The territory hosts a Western military strategic command center having a strong UK-US military base. The training of the Burmese MIS personnel at Diego Garcia and Germany was a standard protocol for those who were destined to rise high in the MIS. The famous MIS Chief Colonel Tin U (*Lamba Tin U*) was also trained in Diego Garcia and Germany. General Ne Win arrested and imprisoned him in 1983, amidst the rumors that he planned a putsch under a liaison with a certain super power.

Today, Myanmar's hold in the region is the strongest in her post-WWII history. She is guarded by three nuclear powers, namely China, India, and Pakistan. She is a member of ASEAN as well as BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation) to which Bhutan and Nepal joined recently in February 2004. She has economic and technical cooperation with all Asian nations from Japan to Pakistan, and even with Australia. China has proven to be her greatest economic as well as military partner. The economic sanctions, which are being imposed by the US and EU, create more prostitutes, with no capability to undo the military rule. In contrast, her neighbors have effectively neutralized her oppositions and pro-democracy activists.

Absolute dependency upon the West has totally disabled the Myanmarese democracy struggle.

**A Revolution Betrayed.** According to French thinker, named Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986), "anger or revolt that does not get into the muscles remains a figment of the imagination" (source: <http://www.newspeakdictionary.com/ot-quotes.html#QRevolution>). This was what happened to the Burmese revolutionary organization, Democratic Alliance of Burma, DAB. As mentioned above, it was formed in 1988 and had a membership of more than 70,000, including a 16,000 strong fighting force. Its objective was to overthrow the military government and establish a democratic federation of Burma. Nevertheless, it decided to postpone its revolution in await of the proposed election results. Again, in 1990 when the election results were out and the SLORC declined to transfer the power to the body of the elected representatives, the

revolutionary DAB stood stunned, puzzled, and lost. As a member of its Central Committee, I urged them in its meeting to form a Provisional Government of Federation of Thuwanna Bhumi, seize Moulmein, occupy Tanessarim coastal strip and stage simultaneous attacks from all fronts around Burma. Thuwanna Bhumi is the oldest name for Burma. It is Pali for “the golden land”. Today, you will also find its Burmese version “Shwe Naignan” at the Myanmar military junta official web site, myanmar.com.

In 1990, DAB was a strong force having both domestic and external support. The 10,000-strong Wa forces and even Khun Sa, the leader of 7,000-strong Mong Tai Army (MTA) came to join DAB. If we count them, DAB fighting force came up to a strength of 33,000. The Wa fighters split off from their mother organization, Burma Communist Party (BCP), in 1989. With such political and military strength the time was ripe for the DAB to strike. It was capable of a strong offensive from all fronts around Burma. Please see the given map; the arrows indicate the DAB member forces.

The DAB failed to do so due to the objection of certain top Bama leaders, who opposed the plan with the message that they could not accept a Karen or a Kachin as a president or a prime minister of the proposed government. They were referring to General Bo Mya and Chairman Breng Seng, who were the President and Vice-President No.1 of DAB, respectively. General Bo Mya was (and still is) also the President of Karen National Union (KNU), whereas Breng Seng (d. 1995) was the Chairman of Kachin Independent Organization (KIO). Indeed, the 250 members of DAB Central Committee would have elected them as the President and Prime Minister of the proposed Federation of Thuwanna Bhumi, with an absolute majority vote. The Bama faction did not stop there. They brought out a group of Bama Representative-elects with the words that had the elected representatives form a government it would be recognized by the United States and other European countries. Today, so-formed Bama-dominated government, in the name of National Coalition Government of Union of Burma (NCGUB), is dwindling in New York City. The racist Bama betrayed the revolution.

As the result of this Bama racial politics, the DAB disintegrated compelling its individual armed members to make peace with the ruling junta.

**Cooperation vs. Confrontation.** When the NLD was crippled and the DAB failed to form a parallel government that would wage a full-fledged civil war, I put up a suggestion to go for cooperation with the military government. I undertook this move by giving a seminar under the heading “Will Thai Model Work in Burma”, at the department of political science at Chiang Mai University, Thailand, in late 1990. My logic is very simple. If we do not want to wage a full-fledged decisive civil war, there virtually is no point of indulging in vanity of meaningless confrontation or engaging in fruitless marginal armed rebellion. In politics, there is no permanent enemy or friend. Today’s bitter enemy could turn into a sweet friend tomorrow and vice versa. We have witnessed Richard Nixon (1913-1994) visiting China in 1972, Leonid Brezhnev (1906-1982) dining with Nixon at Camp David in 1973, and India shaking hands with Pakistan recently.

In the absence of radical and determined political will to overthrow the junta by force, the only rational option we had was to work for the withdrawal of the military from the politics. This is a slow reformist strategy that needs smart strategic maneuvers, tactical manipulations, and above all political maturity, but not stubborn confrontation. When I urged the Myanmar opposition leadership to study democratic struggles in Pakistan and Bangladesh, I was rejected as a pro-Kala (i.e. pro-Indians). When I

discussed the “Thai Model,” I was scorned with vulgar words why I was giving importance to that “prostitute country.” A certain faction of the DAB leadership was very racial.

When we did not want to use force to overthrow the junta, we must create a political exit for them. In the technicality of such a logical exit, passing of an indemnity bill is a necessity. An indemnity bill usually legalizes the military actions during its rule and thus protects the military against the criminal charges. Such indemnity bills were passed in 1979 and 1986, in favor of General Ziaur Rahman(1935-1981) and General Hossein Mohammad Ershad (1930- ) respectively, to facilitate their power transfer to a civilian rule in Bangladesh. Recently in 2003, an indemnity billed was passed by the Pakistan legislature to smoothen out the power transfer of General Prevez Musharraf (1943- ). No one likes such indemnity bills, but we just have to accept it as a bitter reality of our underdeveloped political life. By rejecting the proposed constituent assembly in 1990, Daw Suu and her NLD blocked the exit of the military from national politics. The result was that the military created its own exit by convening a National Convention in 1995.

Having betrayed by the Bama leadership in the revolution, the ethnic armed rebels have no other choice but make peace with the junta and participate in the military-convened national convention. By boycotting the National Convention, the NLD could face greater isolation in national politics in the future.

**A Radical Move.** During the critical time in 1989 and 1990, the Myanmar military junta, SLORC, did an astounding move that changed entire scenario of the armed insurrection. When the 10,000 Wa fighters abandoned their mother party, BCP, they sent an urgent message to NDF and DAB, requesting for aids in terms of food, medicines, and clothes, and also expressing their wish to join NDF and DAB. At that time, I was at Maenarplaw, which was the NDF and DAB headquarter. The NDF is made up of 10 armed ethnic rebel forces, including the KNU and the KIO. The DAB actually was its extension. Bo Mya and Breng Seng were the President and Vice-President of NDF as well. To the great disappointment of many, both NDF and DAB failed to respond to the request of the Wa fighters. On the other hand, the SLORC voluntarily sent 20 truck loads of food, medicine and clothes to the Wa fighters and offered them unconditional ceasefire. This was a radical move by the SLORC, marking the beginning of peace process with the armed rebels. Today, every armed rebel organization including the KNU and KIO has made peace with SLORC-SPDC. In 1997, the SLORC changed its name to SPDC, State Peace and Development Council, signaling that law and order had been restored in the country. The myanmar.com proudly lists 14,000 MTA soldiers, 9994 Wa fighters, and many others who have come to the legal fold.

**The National Convention.** Today, the National Convention, under the scrutiny of the junta, has a 7-point roadmap to democracy in place. It is a continuation of the 1995 convention, which was stalled in 1997. A good number of the DAB members are participating in the National Convention to draft a constitution for a new nation. As a matter of fact, it is a national dictation, rather than a national convention. The military junta is dictating the constitution to the delegates, who have the rights to *cross the t's* and *dot the i's*. Wonderful, indeed! The constitution provides provisions that 25% of the People's Assembly will be occupied by the military officers, who will be delegated by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Thus it has constitutionalized the military rule. It will also



create a quasi federation by establishing State and Divisional legislatures, executives, and judiciary. Again, 25% of a provincial legislature will be filled with the military officers.

**The Release of the prisoners.** According to the junta's official newspapers The New Light of Myanmar, dated Yangon 28 November, 9,248 prisoners have been released. The news was posted at the Myanmar government official web site, myanmar.com. The BBC on line news reported that top democracy activists such as Min Ko Naing and U Win Tin, were among the free prisoners. The News Light of Myanmar also emphasized that the State Peace and Development Council dissolved the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) on 22 October. The junta found that the NIB committed irregularities and improperly imprisoned 9248 convicts. They were now set free. The NIB Chief General Khin Nyunt, who was also the Prime Minister, was arrested and put under the investigation. To a person who grew up in the era of the military rule since 1962, this kind of news does not carry any meaning. General Ne Win and his Military Intelligence Service (MIS) arrested thousands of the citizens with various charges, from corruption to treason, and now and then, released them en masse under the decree of 'General Amnesty'. I was expecting that a decree of General Amnesty would come when the new constitution would be adopted next year, i.e. in 2005. It came a few months earlier than my calculation. The main point is that such release of the prisoners in the days of General Ne Win did not mean any change in politics or daily life of a citizen. He also imprisoned his Military Intelligence Chief Colonel Tin U (*Lamba Tin U*), but no political change took place. Will it make any difference in the days of Senior General Than Shwe?

Reportedly, a good number of the top MIS ranks and files were also arrested and put under investigation by the teams that are made up of the armed forces officers, police officers and civilian officers. Narinjara News reported that the former NIB's jobs, authority, and jurisdiction were transferred to the Police Department. This will mean that no one can be arrested or detained without a warrant or permit issued by a judge. This will also mean that the accused will have the rights to a lawyer and due legal procedure. If these were true, I would say it is a positive development. On the other hand, extension of Mrs. Aung San Suu Kyi Aris detention counter balances above mentioned positive trend.

**Questions.** In 1989 publication of my book *Burma: Nationalism and Ideology*, (University Press Ltd., Dhaka), I asked, "Would they (i.e. the military junta) make peace with the BCP, and the National Liberation Forces?...Would there be a coalition government comprising of Army, civilian, BCP, and Nationalists"? (See the Chapter 8.4 the second last paragraph). Again, I may ask now. Is a 25% military rule a success of the 1988 democracy rising? Does blood of 10,000 activists, who got killed in the 8.8.88 uprising, has put the military totalitarianism to an end? Is a quasi federation a success for the ethnic peoples, whom I call the federating nations? The Union of Burma (1948-1962) was a parliamentary unitary state. The rule of the Revolutionary Council (1962-1974) was a marshal law dictatorship. The Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974-1988) was a military socialist totalitarianism. Now, the Union of Myanmar will become a semi-democratic quasi federation. Is Burma evolving into a democratic federalism? As a matter of fact, this is exactly what Sr. General Than Shwe has been propagating. Is it true, then? If so, how shall we explain: - (1) forced labor, (2) forced relocations, (3) grave human rights abuses, (4) systematic ethnic cleansing, (5) erasing of our Rakhing kingdom history, (6) planned-destruction of our cultural heritage and archeological sites,

(7) confiscation of agricultural land from the Rakhaing farmers for redistribution among the Bama soldiers? In short, will it make any difference to the people of Rakkhapura? The answers to these questions may lie in a famous Irish fairy tale.

**The Pot of Gold.** One famous Irish fairy tale tells us that there is a pot of gold at the end of rainbow, which is guarded by a 2-feet tall old humanoid called Leprechaun. If you get hold of Leprechaun, you can force him to give you the pot of gold. He would take you to the end of the rainbow<sup>(3)</sup> to show you the hidden spot of the gold pot. The deal is that you cannot take off your eyes from him, even for a wink. If you happen to do so, he would just disappear and you lost your chance of getting the pot of gold. On the way, Leprechaun will deceive you with many tricks to divert your eyes from him. So far, no one has been able to resist and overcome Leprechaun's deceptions. That means the pot of gold is still there at the end of the rainbow. Similarly, I am afraid that Myanmar military Leprechaun might be playing tricks to all of us to keep the democratic pot of gold for himself, forever.

**Overview:** In the era of post-8.8.88, the opposition forces, including the NLD, Daw Suu and the armed rebel organizations, do not have any well-planned strategy and tactics. They simply respond the proposition of the moves put up by the military junta. Their responses are either emotional or a choice of convenience. In contrast the military junta has exercised a sound strategy with well-designed tactics; it displays a classic performance of *the-end-justifies-the-means*. As long as the opposition forces lack soundly planned strategy and tactics the military will remain in power in Burma.

Notes:

(1). The 1966 Phadu Summit was between Bo Gri Kra Hla and Chairman Kyaw Zan Rhwee to reach an understanding of cooperation in our struggle for freedom. The Chairman told us what I quoted here, in response to my question with regard to the power structure in a federation.

(2). "Catch-22" is a word that comes into the English literature after Joseph Miller's novel *Catch-22*, published in 1961. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991) defines it as "a frustrating situation in which one is trapped by contradictory regulations or conditions." In Joseph Miller's novel "Catch-22" refers to the military regulations that espouse "circular logic." The novel is in the English curricula of American High Schools.

(3). As a matter of fact, we cannot reach the end of the rainbows because the rainbows actually are circular, not just semi-circles as we usually see. The round earth hides the lower part of the circle. If you fly high in an airplane you have a good chance of seeing a good circular rainbow.

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